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Abstract
This paper studies optimal communication and coordination strategies in cyber-physical systems for both defender and attacker
within a game-theoretic framework. We model the communication network of a cyber-physical system as a sensor network which
involves one single Gaussian source observed by many sensors, subject to additive independent Gaussian observation noises. The
sensors communicate with the estimator over a coherent Gaussian multiple access channel. The aim of the receiver is to reconstruct
the underlying source with minimum mean squared error. The scenario of interest here is one where some of the sensors are
captured by the attacker and they act as the adversary (jammer): they strive to maximize distortion. The receiver (estimator) knows
the captured sensors but still cannot simply ignore them due to the multiple access channel, i.e., the outputs of all sensors are
summed to generate the estimator input. We show that the ability of transmitter sensors to secretly agree on a random event, that
is “coordination”, plays a key role in the analysis. Depending on the coordination capability of the sensors and the receiver, we
consider three different problem settings. The first setting involves transmitters and the receiver with “coordination” capabilities.
Here, all transmitters can use identical realization of randomized encoding for each transmission. In this case, the optimal strategy
for the adversary sensors also exploits coordination, where they all generate the same realization of independent and identically
distributed Gaussian noise. In the second setting, the transmitter sensors are restricted to use deterministic encoders, and this
setting, which corresponds to a Stackelberg game, does not admit a saddle-point solution. We show that the optimal strategy
for all sensors is uncoded communications where encoding functions of adversaries and transmitters are aligned in opposite
directions. In the third, and last, setting where only a subset of the transmitter and/or jammer sensors can coordinate, we show
that the solution radically depends on the fraction of the transmitter sensors that can coordinate. In the second half of the paper,
we extend our analysis to an asymmetric scenario where we remove the assumption of identical power and noise variances for
all sensors. Limiting the optimal strategies to conditionally affine mappings, we derive the optimal power scheduling over the
sensors. We show that optimal power scheduling renders coordination superfluous for the attacker, when the transmitter sensors
exploit coordination, as the attacker allocates all adversarial power to one sensor. In the setting where coordination is not allowed,
both the attacker and the transmitter sensors distribute power among all available sensors to utilize the well-known estimation
diversity in distributed settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are large-scale interconnected systems of heterogeneous, yet collaborating, components
that provide integration of computation with physical processes [1]. The inherent heterogeneity and integration of different
components in CPS pose new security challenges [2]. One such security challenge pertains to the CPS communication network.
Most CPSs rely on the presence of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) composed of distributed nodes that communicate
their measurements to a central state estimator (fusion center) with higher computation capabilities. Efficient and reliable
communication of these measurements is a critical aspect of WSN systems that determine usability of the infrastructure.
Consider the architecture shown in Figure 1 where multiple sensors observe the state of the plant and transmit their observations
over a wireless multiple access channel (MAC) to a central estimator (fusion center) which decides on the control action. The
sensors in such architectures are known to be vulnerable to various attacks, see e.g., [3]–[5] and the references therein. For
example, sensors may be captured and analyzed such that the attacker gains insider information about the communication
scheme and networking protocols. The attacker can then reprogram the compromised sensors and use them to launch the
so-called Byzantine attack [6]–[9], where the objective of these adversarial sensors can be i) to distort the estimate made at
the fusion center, which corresponds to a zero-sum game where the transmitting sensors aim to minimize some distortion
associated the state measurements while the objective of the attacker is to maximize it, or ii) strategically craft messages to
deceive the estimator in a way to render its estimate close to a predetermined, biased value [10], as was done in the replay
attacks of StuxNet in SCADA systems [11]. This paper presents an information/communication theoretic approach to Bayesian
optimal sensor fusion in the presence of Byzantine sensors for the first setting, while a preliminary analysis of the second case
can be found in [12].
We analyze the communication scenario from the perspective of joint source-channel coding (JSCC) which has certain
advantages over separate source and channel coding for sensor networks; see e.g., [13] and the references therein. In this
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Fig. 1. The basic cyber-physical system model. The sensor in red color is a Byzantine sensor, i.e., it is captured by the adversary.
paper, we extend the game theoretic analysis of the Gaussian test channel [14]–[17] to Gaussian sensor networks studied
by [13], [18]–[24]. In [18], the performance of a simple uncoded communication is studied, in conjunction with optimal
power assignment over the sensors given a sum power budget. For a particular symmetric setting, Gastpar showed that indeed
this uncoded scheme is optimal over all encoding/decoding methods that allow arbitrarily high delay [25]. However, it is
well understood that in more realistic asymmetric settings, the uncoded communication scheme is suboptimal, and in fact,
the optimal communication strategies are unknown for these settings [26], [27]. Information-theoretic analysis of the scaling
behavior of such sensor networks, in terms of the number of sensors, is provided in [28].
In this paper, building on our earlier work on the topic [29], [30], we consider three settings for the sensor network model,
which is illustrated in Figure 2 and described in detail in Section II. The first M sensors (i.e., the transmitters) and the single
receiver constitute Player 1 (minimizer) and the remaining K sensors (i.e., the adversaries) constitute Player 2 (maximizer).
Formulated as a zero-sum game, this setting does not admit a saddle point in pure strategies (deterministic encoding functions),
but admits one in mixed strategies (randomized functions). In the first setting we consider, the transmitter sensors are allowed
to use randomized encoders, i.e., all transmitters and the receiver agree on some (pseudo)random sequence, denoted as {γ}
in the paper. We coin the term “coordination” for this capability, show that it plays a pivotal role in the analysis and the
implementation of optimal strategies for both the transmitter and the adversarial sensors , and provide the mixed-strategy
saddle-point solution in Theorem 1. In the second setting, we have a hierarchical scheme; it can be viewed as a Stackelberg
game where Player 1 is the leader, restricted to pure strategies, and Player 2 is the follower, who observes Player 1’s choice
of pure strategies and plays accordingly. We present in Theorem 2 the optimal strategies for this Stackelberg game, whose
cost is strictly higher than the cost associated with the first setting. The sharp contrast between the two settings underlines
the importance of “coordination” in sensor networks with adversarial nodes. In the third setting, we consider only a given
subset of the transmitters and also the adversarial sensors can coordinate. We show that if the number of transmitter sensors
that can coordinate is sufficiently high (compared to ones that cannot), then the problem becomes a zero-sum game with a
saddle-point, where the coordination-capable transmitters use randomized linear strategy and the remaining transmitters are
not used at all. It may at first appear to be counter intuitive to forgo utilization of the second set of transmitter sensors but
the gain from coordination (by the first set of transmitter sensors) more than compensates for this loss. Coordination is also
important for the adversarial sensors. When transmitters coordinate, adversaries would benefit from coordination to generate
identical realizations of Gaussian jamming noise. In contrast with transmitters, the adversarial sensors which cannot coordinate
are of use: they generate independent copies of identically distributed Gaussian jamming noise. Otherwise, i.e., the number of
coordinating transmitters is not sufficiently high, transmitters use deterministic (pure strategies) linear encoding, and optimal
adversarial strategy is also uncoded communications in the opposite direction of the transmitters.
In the second part of the paper, we extend the analysis to asymmetric settings where sensing and/or communications channels,
and allowed transmission power of each sensor are different. For this setting, information-theoretically optimal source-channel
coding strategies are unknown (see e.g., [31] for inner and outer bounds of optimal performance). Here, we assume that the
sensors use uncoded (zero-delay) linear communication strategies, which are optimal for the symmetric setting. We also allow
another coordination capability to the sensors to combat with this inherent heterogeneity: we assume a total power limit over
the sensors which allows for power allocation over sensors. We assume this power allocation optimization capability is also
available to the adversarial sensors. We derive optimal power scheduling strategies for the transmitter and the adversarial
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Fig. 2. The sensor network model.
sensors for both settings, i.e., with or without coordination1. We show that the power allocation capability renders coordination
superfluous for the adversarial sensors, while it is still beneficial to the transmitter sensors.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we formulate the problem. In Section III, we present our results pertaining
to the symmetric setting, and in Section IV, we analyze the asymmetric case. In Section V, we present conclusions and discuss
possible future directions of research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
In general, lowercase letters (e.g., x) denote scalars, boldface lowercase (e.g., x) vectors, uppercase (e.g., U,X) matrices
and random variables, and boldface uppercase (e.g., X) random vectors. The kth element of vector x is denoted by [x]k. E(·),
P(·), R, and R+ denote, respectively, the expectation and probability operators, and the sets of real and positive real numbers.
Bern(p) denotes the Binary random variable, taking values 1 with probability p and −1 with probability 1−p. Gaussian
distribution with mean vector µ and covariance matrix R is denoted as N (µ, R). The mutual information of random variables
X and Y is denoted by I(X;Y ).
B. Problem Formulation
The sensor network model is depicted in Figure 2. The underlying source {S(i)} is a sequence of i.i.d. real valued Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance2. Sensor m ∈ [1 :M+K] observes a sequence {Um(i)} defined as
Um(i) = S(i) + βmWm(i), (1)
where {Wm(i)} is a sequence of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance, independent of {S(i)},
and βm ∈ R+ is the deterministic fading coefficient for the sensing channel. Sensor m ∈ [1 :M+K] can apply arbitrary Borel
measurable function gNm : RN → RN to the observation sequence of length N , Um so as to generate the vector of length N
channel inputs Xm = gNm(Um) under power constraint:
N∑
i=1
E{X2m(i)} ≤ Pm (2)
The channel output is then given as
Y (i) = Z(i) +
M+K∑
m=1
αmXm(i) (3)
1Here, the term coordination refers to the sensors’ ability on generating identical realization of a (pseudo)random sequence.
2Normalizing the variance to 1 does not lead to any loss of generality.
4where {Z(i)} is a sequence of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables of zero mean and unit variance, independent of {S(i)} and
{Wm(i)} and αm ∈ R+ is the deterministic fading coefficient for the communication channel of the m-th sensor. The receiver
applies a Borel measurable function hN : RN → RN to the received length-N vector Y to generate Sˆ
Sˆ = hN (Y ) (4)
that minimize the cost, which is measured as mean squared error (MSE) between the underlying source S and the estimate at
the receiver Sˆ as
J({gNm(·)}M+Km=1 , hN (·)) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
E{(S(i)− Sˆ(i))2}. (5)
Game model: There are two players: transmitter sensors and the receiver constitute Player 1 who seeks to minimize (5)
over {gNm(·)}Mm=1 and hN (·). Player 2 comprises the adversarial sensors whose common objective is to maximize (5) by
properly choosing {gNk (·)}M+Kk=M+1. Since there is a complete conflict of interest, this problem constitutes a zero-sum game. We
primarily consider the Stackelberg solution where Player-1 is the leader and plays first as a consequence of being the leader,
and the Player-2 is the follower, responds to the strategies of Player-1. The game proceeds as follows: Player-1 plays first and
announces its mappings. Player-2, knowing the mappings of Player-1, determines its own mappings that maximize t (5), given
the strategy of Player 1. Player-1 of course, will anticipate this, and pick its mappings accordingly. The adversarial sensors
have access to the knowledge of the strategy of the transmitter sensors (except the sequence of coordination variables {γ} that
enables Player-1 to use randomized strategies) while the receiver has access to the strategies of all sensors, i.e., the receiver
also knows the statistics of the sensors captured by the adversary. We also note that the statistics of the variables, and the
problem parameters, including the fading coefficients, are common knowledge.
More formally, we are primarily interested in
JU , min{gNm}Mm=1,hN
max
{gNk }M+Kk=M+1
J
({gNm}Mm=1, {gNk }M+Kk=M+1, hN) (6)
which is the upper value of the game.
Some of the settings we analyze here admit, a special case of the described Stackelberg solution: a saddle-point solution. A
transmitter-receiver-adversarial policy (gN∗m , g
N∗
k , h
N∗) constitutes a saddle-point solution if it satisfies the pair of inequalities
J({gN∗m }Mm=1, {gNk }M+Kk=M+1, hN∗) ≤ J({gN∗m }Mm=1, {gN∗k }M+Kk=M+1, hN∗) ≤ J({gNm}Mm=1, {gN∗k }M+Kk=M+1, hN ) (7)
We also show that whenever a saddle-point solution exists, it is essentially unique3. At the saddle point, it is well-known
that the following holds (cf. [32]):
JU = J({gN∗m }Mm=1, {gN∗k }M+Kk=M+1, hN∗) = JL (8)
which we will refer as the saddle-point cost throughout the paper, where
JL = max
{gNk }M+Kk=M+1
min
{gNm}Mm=1,hN
J
({gNm}Mm=1, {gNk }M+Kk=M+1, hN) (9)
We are primarily concerned with the information-theoretic analysis of fundamental limits, and hence we take N →∞.
In this paper, we consider three different problem settings (denoted as settings I, II and III), depending on the “coordination”
capabilities of sensors. A salient encoding strategy that we will frequently encounter in this paper is the uncoded4 linear
communication strategy where the N -letter communication mapping gNm consist of N identical linear maps:
gm(Um(i)) = cmUm(i)
where cm satisfies the individual sensor power constraint with equality, i.e., cm =
√
Pm
1+β2m
for m = 1, . . . ,M .
III. THE SYMMETRIC SCENARIO
In this section, we focus on the symmetric scenario. More formally, we have the following symmetry assumption.
Assumption 1 (Symmetry Assumption). All sensors have identical problem parameters: βm = β, αm = α, and Pm = P for
all m ∈ [1 :M +K].
3In these settings, multiple strategies, that are different only upto a sign change, yield the same cost. To account for such trivially equivalent forms, we use
the term “essentially unique.”
4Throughout this paper, we use “uncoded”, “zero-delay” interchangeably to denote “symbol-by-symbol” coding structure.
5A. Problem Setting I
The first setting is concerned with the situation where the transmitter sensors have the ability to coordinate, i.e., all transmitters
and the receiver can agree on an i.i.d. sequence of random variables {γ(i)} generated, for example, by a side channel, the output
of which is, however, not available to the adversarial sensors5. The ability of coordination allows transmitters and the receiver
to agree on randomized encoding mappings. Perhaps surprisingly, in this setting, the adversarial sensors can also benefit from
coordination, i.e., agree on an i.i.d. random sequence, denoted as {θ(i)}, to generate the optimal jamming strategy.
The saddle-point solution of this problem is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Setting I, and under Assumption 1, admits a saddle-point solution with the following strategies: the strategy of
the transmitter sensors is randomized uncoded transmission
Xm(i) = γ(i) cUm(i), 1 ≤ m ≤M (10)
where {γ(i)} is an i.i.d. sequence of binary variables γ(i) ∼ Bern( 12 ), and c =
√
P
1+β2 . The optimal jamming function (for
adversarial sensors) is to generate the i.i.d. Gaussian output
Xk(i) = θ(i), M + 1 ≤ k ≤M +K
where
θ(i) ∼ N (0, P ),
and is independent of the adversarial sensor input Uk(i). The strategy of the receiver is the Bayesian estimator of S given Y ,
i.e.,
h(Y (i)) =
M cαβ
M2α2β2c2 +Mc2α2 +K2P + 1
γ(i)Y (i). (11)
The cost at this saddle-point is
JSC(M,K) =
Mc2α2 +K2P + 1
M2α2β2c2 +Mc2α2 +K2P + 1
(12)
Moreover, this saddle-point solution is essentially unique.
Proof: We start by verifying that the mappings given in the theorem satisfy the pair of saddle-point inequalities (7),
following the approach in [16].
RHS of (7): Suppose the policy of the adversarial sensors is given as in Theorem 1. Then, the communication system at hand
becomes essentially identical to the problem considered in [25], whose solution is uncoded communication with deterministic,
linear encoders, i.e., Xm(i) = cUm(i). Any probabilistic encoder, given in the form of (10) (irrespective of the density of γ) yield
the same cost (12) with deterministic encoders and hence is optimal. Given that the optimal transmitter is in the form of (10), the
optimal decoder is also zero-delay (symbol-by-symbol) mapping given as h(Y (i)) = E{S(i)|Y (i)} = E{SY }(E{Y 2})−1Y (i)
which can be explicitly obtained as in (11) noting that
Y = c α γ(i)
M∑
m=1
Um(i) + α
M+K∑
k=M+1
Xk(i) + Z(i) (13)
E{SY } = γ(i)Mβcα, E{Y 2} = 1 +K2P + (Mβcα)2 +Mα2c2. (14)
The distortion is (observing that σ2S = 1):
J = 1− (E{SY })
2
E{Y 2} =
Mc2α2 +K2P + 1
M2α2β2c2 +Mc2α2 +K2P + 1
(15)
LHS of (7): By the symmetry of the problem, we assume, without any loss of generality, that all adversarial sensors use the
same jamming strategy. Let us derive the overall cost conditioned on the realization of the transmitter mappings (i.e., γ = 1
and γ = −1) used in conjunction with optimal linear decoders. If γ = 1
D1 = J1 + ξE{SXk}+ ψE{ZXk} (16)
for some constants ξ, ψ, and similarly if γ = −1
D2 = J1 − ξE{SXk} − ψE{ZXk} (17)
where the overall cost is
D(i) = P(γ(i) = 1)D1 + P(γ(i) = −1)D2. (18)
5An alternative practical method to coordinate is to generate the identical pseudo-random numbers at each sensor, based on pre-determined seed.
6Clearly, for γ(i) ∼ Bern( 12 ) the overall cost J1 is only a function of the second-order statistics of the adversarial outputs,
irrespective of the distribution of {θ(i)}, and hence the solution presented here is indeed a saddle-point. Having established
this fact, we next show this saddle point is essentially unique.
Gaussianity of Xk(i): The choice Xk(i) = θ(i) maximizes (5) since it renders the simple uncoded linear mappings
asymptotically optimal, i.e., the transmitters cannot improve on the zero-delay performance by utilizing asymptotically high
delays. Moreover, the optimal zero-delay performance is always lower bounded by the performance of the linear mappings,
which is imposed by the adversarial choice of Xk(i) = θ(i).
Independence of {Xk(i)} of {S(i)} and {W (i)}: If the adversarial sensors introduce some correlation, i.e., if E{SXk} 6= 0
or E{WXk} 6= 0, the transmitter can adjust its Bernoulli parameter to decrease the distortion. Hence, the optimal adversarial
strategy is setting E{SXk} = E{WXk} = 0 which implies independence since all variables are jointly Gaussian.
Choice of Bernoulli parameter: Note that the optimal choice of the Bernoulli parameter for the transmitters is 12 since other
choices will not cancel the cross terms in (16) and (17), i.e., E{SXk} and E{WXk}. These cross terms can be exploited by
the adversary to increase the cost, hence optimal strategy for transmitter is to set γ = Bern(1/2).
Corollary 1 (Value of Coordination). Coordination, i.e., the ability of using a common randomized sequence, is beneficial to
adversarial sensors in the case of coordinating transmitters and receiver, in the sense that lack of adversarial coordination
strictly decreases the overall cost.
Proof: Note that coordination, i.e., to be able to generate the same realization of θ(i) enables adversarial sensors to
generate a Gaussian noise with variance K2PA yielding the cost in (12). However, without coordination, each sensor can only
generate independent Gaussian random variables, yielding an overall Gaussian noise with variance KP and the total cost
Mc2α2 +KP + 1
M2α2β2c2 +Mc2α2 +KP + 1
< JSC(M,K) (19)
Hence, coordination of adversarial sensors strictly increases the overall cost.
Remark 1. We note that the optimal strategies do not depend on the sensor index m, hence the implementation of the optimal
strategy, for both transmitter and adversarial sensors, requires “coordination” among the sensors. This highlights the need for
coordination in game theoretic settings in sensor networks. Note that this coordination requirement arises purely from the game
theoretic considerations, i.e., the presence of adversarial sensors. In the case where no adversarial node exists, transmitters
do not need to “coordinate”. Moreover, as we will show in Theorem 2 if the transmitters cannot coordinate, then adversarial
sensors do not need to coordinate.
B. Problem Setting II
Here, we address the second setting, where the transmitters do not have the ability to secretly agree on a sequence of i.i.d.
“coordination” random variables, {γ}, to generate their transmission functions Xm. This setting does not admit a saddle-point
solution, hence a Stackelberg solution is sought here. We also assume the number of adversarial sensors is less than the number
of transmitter ones, i.e., K < M , otherwise (if M ≥ K) the adversarial sensors can effectively eliminate the output of the
transmitters, and the problem becomes trivial.
We show that the essentially unique Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved by a transmitter strategy, which is identical across
all transmitters: uncoded transmission with linear mappings. The equilibrium achieving strategy for the attack sensors, again
identical across all adversarial sensors, is uncoded transmission with linear mappings, but with the opposite sign of the
transmitter. The receiver strategy is symbol-by-symbol optimal estimation of the source from the channel output. A rather
surprising observation is that the adversarial coordination (in the sense of sharing a random sequence that is hidden from
the transmitter sensors and the receiver) of is superfluous for this setting, i.e., even if the adversarial sensors are allowed to
cooperate, the optimal mappings and hence, the resulting cost at the saddle point do not change.
The following theorem captures this result.
Theorem 2. For setting II and under Assumption 1, the essentially unique Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved by:
Xm(i) = cUm(i), 1 ≤ m ≤M
for the transmitter sensors and
Xk(i) = −cUk(i), M + 1 ≤ k ≤M +K
for the adversarial sensors. The optimal receiver strategy is the symbol-by-symbol Bayesian estimator of S given Y , i.e.,
h(Y (i)) =
(M −K) c αβ
(M −K)2α2β2c2 + (M −K)c2α2 + 1Y (i). (20)
7The cost at this Stackelberg solution is
JSNC(M,K) =
(M −K)c2α2 + 1
(M −K)2α2β2c2 + (M −K)c2α2 + 1 (21)
Proof: Let us first find the cost at the equilibrium, JSNC , for the given encoding strategies. We start by computing the
expressions used in the MMSE computations,
Y = c α
(
M∑
m=1
Um −
M+K∑
k=M+1
Uk
)
+ Z (22)
E{SY } = (M −K) c αβ, E{Y 2} = (M −K)2α2β2c2 + (M −K)c2α2 + 1. (23)
Plugging these expressions, we obtain the cost, JSNC(M,K) = 1− (E{SY })
2
E{Y 2} as given in (21), and the optimal receiver strategy,
h(Y (i))E{SY }(E{Y 2})−1Y (i) as in (20).
We next show that linear mappings are the optimal (in the information-theoretic sense) encoding and decoding strategies.
We first note that adversarial sensors have the knowledge of the transmitter encoding functions, and hence the adversarial
encoding functions will be in the same form as the transmitters functions but with a negative sign i.e., since outputs are sent
over an additive channel (see e.g., [16], [17] for a proof of this result). We next proceed to find the optimal encoding functions
for the transmitters subject to this restriction. From the data processing theorem, we must have
I(U1,U2, . . . ,UM+K ; Sˆ) ≤ I(X1,X2, . . . ,XM+K ;Y ) (24)
where we use the notational shorthand Um = [Um(1), Um(2), . . . , Um(N)] (and likewise for Xm,Y and Sˆ) for length N
sequences of random variables. The left hand side can be lower bounded as:
I(U1,U2, . . . ,UM+K ; Sˆ) ≥ R(D) (25)
where R(D) is the rate-distortion function of the Gaussian CEO problem adopted to our setting, and is derived in Appendix
A. The right hand side can be upper bounded by
I(X1,X2, ...,XM+K ;Y )
(a)
≤
N∑
i=1
I(X1(i), . . . , XM+K(i);Y (i)) (26)
≤ max
N∑
i=1
I(X1(i), . . . , XM+K(i);Y (i)) (27)
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
log(1 + 1TRX(i)1) (28)
where RX(i) is defined as
{RX(i)}p,r , E{Xp(i)Xr(i)} ∀p, r ∈ [1 : M+K]. (29)
Note that (a) follows from the memoryless property of the channel and the maximum in (27) is over the joint density
over X1(i), . . . , XM+K(i) given the structural constraints on RX(i) due to the power constraints. It is well known that the
maximum is achieved, uniquely, by the jointly Gaussian density for a given fixed covariance structure [33], yielding (28). Since
logarithm is a monotonically increasing function, the optimal encoding functions gNm(·),m ∈ [1 :M ] equivalently maximize∑
p,r
E{Xp(i)Xr(i)}. Note that
Xm(i) =
[
gNm(Um)
]
i
(30)
and hence {gNm(·)}Mm=1 that maximize
p=M+K∑
p=1
r=M+K∑
r=1
E{[gNp (Up)]i[gNr (U r)]i} (31)
can be found by invoking Witsenhausen’s lemma (given in Appendix B) as [gNm(Um)]i = c Um(i) for all i ∈ [1 : N ], and
hence gNm(Um) = c Um for all m ∈ [1 : M ]. Finally, we obtain JSNC as an outer bound by equating the left and right hand
sides of (24). The linear mappings in Theorem 2 achieve this outer bound, and hence are optimal.
Corollary 2. Source-channel separation, based on digital compression and communications is strictly suboptimal for this
setting.
8Proof: We first note that the optimal adversarial encoding functions must be the negative of that of the transmitters to
achieve the saddle-point solution derived in Theorem 2. But then, the problem at hand becomes equivalent to a problem with
no adversary which was studied in [13], where source-channel separation was shown to be strictly suboptimal. Hence, separate
source-channel coding has to be suboptimal for our problem. A more direct proof follows from the calculation of the separate
source-channel coding performance.
Corollary 3. Coordination is beneficial to transmitter sensors, in the sense that lack of coordination strictly increases the
equilibrium cost.
Proof: Proof follows from the fact that JSC < J
S
NC .
C. Problem Setting III
The focus of this section is the setting between the two extreme scenarios of coordination, namely full, or no coordination.
In the following, we assume that M transmitter sensors can coordinate with the receiver while M(1 − ) of them cannot
coordinate, where 0 <  < 1 and M is integer. Similarly, we consider only Kη of the adversarial sensors can coordinate
while the remaining K(1 − η) adversarial sensors cannot, where 0 < η < 1 and Kη is integer. Let us reorder the sensors,
without loss of generality, such that the first M transmitters and Kη adversaries can coordinate. We again take K < M . Let
us also define the quantity 0 as the unique6 solution to:
JSC(M0,
√
K2η2 +K(1− η)) = JSNC(M,K) (32)
The following theorem captures our main result.
Theorem 3. For  > 0, there exists a saddle-point solution with the following strategies: the optimal transmission strategy
requires that the M capable transmitters use randomized linear encoding, while the remaining M(1− ) transmitters are not
used.
Xm(i) = γ(i) cUm(i), 1 ≤ m ≤M (33)
Xm(i) = 0 M ≤ m ≤M (34)
where {γ(i)} is an i.i.d. sequence of binary variables γ(i) ∼ Bern( 12 ). The optimal jamming policy (for the coordination-
capable adversarial sensors) is to generate the identical Gaussian noise
Xk(i) = θ(i), M + 1 ≤ k ≤M +Kη (35)
while the remaining adversarial sensors will generate independent Gaussian noise
Xk(i) = θk(i), M +Kη ≤ k ≤M +K (36)
where θk(i) ∼ N (0, P ) are independent of the adversarial sensor input Uk(i). The receiver strategy at this saddle point is
h(Y (i)) =
Mcαβ
M22α2β2c2 +Mc2α2 + (K2η2 +K(1− η))P + 1γ(i)Y (i). (37)
If  < 0, the Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved with the deterministic linear encoding for the transmitter sensors, i.e.,
Xm(i) = cUm(i), 1 ≤ m ≤M (38)
and the adversarial sensors use identical functional form with opposite sign of the transmitters, i.e.,
Xk(i) = −cUk(i), M + 1 ≤ k ≤M +K (39)
and the receiver uses
h(Y (i)) =
(M −K) c αβ
(M −K)2α2β2c2 + (M −K)c2α2 + 1Y (i). (40)
Proof: The transmitters have two choices: i) All transmitters will choose not to use randomization. Then, the adversarial
sensors do not need to use randomization since the optimal strategy is deterministic, linear coding with the opposite sign, as
shown in Theorem 2. Hence, the cost associated with this option is JSNC(M,K). ii) Capable transmitters will use randomized
encoding. This choice implies that remaining transmitters do not send information as they do not have access to randomization
sequence {γ}, hence they are not used. The adversarial sensors which can coordinate generate identical realization of the
Gaussian noise while, remaining adversaries generate independent realizations. The total effective noise adversarial power will
be ((Kη)2 + (1 − η)K)P , and the cost associated with this setting is JSC(M,
√
K2η2 +K(1− η)). Hence, transmitters
will choose between two options depending on their costs, JSC(M,
√
K2η2 +K(1− η)) and JSNC(M,K). Since, JSC is a
6The fact that JSC is monotonically decreasing in 0 ensures that (32) admits a unique solution.
9decreasing function in M and hence in , whenever  > 0, transmitters use randomization (and hence so do the adversaries),
otherwise problem setting becomes identical to “no coordination”. The rest of the proof simply follows from the proofs of
Theorems 1 and 2.
Remark 2. Note that in the first regime ( > 0), we have a zero-sum game with saddle-point. In the second regime ( < 0),
we have a Stackelberg game where all transmitters and receiver constitute the leader and adversaries constitute the follower.
Remark 3. Theorem 3 states a rather interesting observation: depending on the network conditions, the optimal transmission
strategy may not use all of the transmitter sensors. At first glance, it might seem that discarding some of the available transmitter
sensors is suboptimal. However, there is no feasible way to use these sensors, which cannot coordinate, without compromising
the benefits of coordination.
IV. THE ASYMMETRIC SCENARIO
In this section, we remove the assumption of identical sensing and channel noise variances and identical transmitter and
adversary average power. Instead, we assume there is a sum-power limit for the set of transmitters and for the set of adversarial
nodes. In this general asymmetric case, the optimal, in information-theoretic sense, communication strategies are unknown in
the absence of adversary. Here, we assume zero-delay linear strategies, in the light of our results in previous section, which
provide an upper bound on the distortion-power performance:
Assumption 2. In Setting-I (where the transmitter sensors can coordinate), the transmission strategies are restricted to
Xm(i) = γ(i)cmUm(i) (41)
where {γ(i)} is an i.i.d sequence of binary variables γ(i) ∼ Bern( 12 ). In Setting-II (where no coordination is allowed), the
transmission strategies are limited to
Xm(i) = cmUm(i). (42)
The problem we address in this section is two-fold: i) determine the optimal power allocation strategies for a given sum-power
constraint of the form:
M∑
m=1
Pm ≤ PT , (43)
and ii) determine the optimal adversarial sensor strategies subject to a sum power constraint:
M+K∑
k=M+1
Pk ≤ PA, (44)
Before deriving our results, we introduce a few variables.
Definition. We let k∗ be the index of an adversarial sensor having the best communication channel, i.e.,
k∗ , argmax
k∈[M+1:M+K]
αk
and P ′A is the associated received power P
′
A , α2k∗ PA . In the case of multiple k∗s, we pick one arbitrarily.
A. Setting-I
In this setting, the transmitters can coordinate, similar to the setting studied in Section III-A. Following the same steps as
in Section III-A, we conclude that the solution sought here is a saddle point.
Theorem 4. For setting I, and under Assumption 2, an essentially unique saddle-point solution exists with the following
strategies: the communication strategy for the transmitter sensor m is given in (41) where
cm =
λ2αmβm
2 (1 + β2m + λ1α
2
m)
, λ1 =
PT
1 + P ′A
,
λ2 =
√√√√√ 4PTM∑
m=1
(1+β2m)α
2
mβ
2
m
(1+β2m+λ1α
2
m)
2
The attacker uses only sensor k∗, and it generates i.i.d. Gaussian output
X∗k(i) = θ(i), where θ(i) ∼ N (0, PA),
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which is independent of the adversarial sensor input Uk∗(i). The receiver is the Bayesian estimator of S given Y , i.e.,
h(Y (i)) =
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)
γ(i)Y (i)
1 + P ′A +
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2
+
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
. (45)
The cost at this saddle-point solution is
JASC =
(
1 + λ1
M∑
m=1
α2mβ
2
m
2 (1 + β2m + λ1α
2
m)
)−1
. (46)
Proof: The existence of an essentially unique saddle-point solution follows from the same reasoning in Theorem 1. Let us
take the transmission strategy as given in the theorem statement and derive the optimal attack strategy. Note that essentially,
the attacker’s role is limited to adding Gaussian noise subject to attack power PA, the only remaining question here is how to
allocate its power to the sensors. The objective of the attacker is to maximize the effective channel noise, i.e., to maximize:
M+K∑
k=M
αkE{θ2k} subject to
M+K∑
k=M
E{θ2k} ≤ PA. The solution of this problem is simply: the attacker picks the best attack channel,
i.e., the sensor with the largest αk, allocates all adversarial power on this sensor.
Applying the optimal encoding map given in (41), and given adversary strategy we have the following auxillary expressions
for the terms used in standard MMSE estimation.
Y = γ(i)
M∑
m=1
cm αmUm(i) +
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkXk(i) + Z(i) (47)
E{SY } = γ(i)
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm, E{Y 2} = 1 + P ′A +
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2
+
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m. (48)
The distortion is (observing that σ2S = 1):
J =1− (E{SY })
2
E{Y 2} (49)
=1−
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2
1 + P ′A +
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2
+
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
, (50)
=
1 +K2P +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
1 + P ′A +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m +
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2 . (51)
Then, the problem is to determine cm that minimizes (51) subject to the power constraint,
M∑
m=1
(1 + β2m)c
2
m ≤ PT . We first
note that this problem is not convex in cm. By changing the variables, we convert this problem into a convex form which
is analytically solvable. First, instead of minimizing the distortion with a power constraint, we can equivalently minimize the
power with a distortion constraint. Since distortion is a convex function of the total power (otherwise it can be converted to a
convex problem by time sharing), there is no duality gap by this modification (cf. [34]). The modified problem is to minimize:
M∑
m=1
(1 + β2m)c
2
m, (52)
subject to
1 + P ′A +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
1 + P ′A +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m +
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2 ≤ J. (53)
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Note that
1
J
= 1 +
(
M∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2
1 + P ′A +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
(54)
Next, we introduce a slack variable
r =
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm. (55)
The optimization problem is to minimize
M∑
m=1
(1 + β2m)c
2
m, (56)
subject to
1 + P ′A +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m ≤ (J−1 − 1)−1r2, (57)
and (55). This problem is convex in the variables cm and r. Hence, we construct the Lagrangian cost as
J =
M∑
m=1
(
1 + β2m
)
c2m +λ1
(
1+ P ′A +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m−
r2
(J−1 − 1)
)
+ λ2
(
r −
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm
)
, (58)
where λ1 ∈ R+ and λ2 ∈ R. The first-order conditions for stationarity of the Lagrangian yield:
∂J
∂cm
=2cm(1+β
2
m)+2λ1cmα
2
m−λ2αmβm=0, (59)
∂J
∂r
= −2λ1(J−1 − 1)−1r + λ2 = 0, (60)
and we have (55) and
1 + P ′A +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m =
(
J−1 − 1)−1 r2. (61)
From (59), we have
cm =
λ2αmβm
2 (1 + β2m + λ1α
2
m)
. (62)
Using (62) in (55), we have
λ22
4λ1
M∑
m=1
α2mβ
2
m
(1 + β2m + λ1α
2
m)
= 1 + P ′A +
λ22
4
M∑
m=1
α4mβ
2
m
(1 + β2m + λ1α
2
m)
2 (63)
which simplifies to
λ1(1 + P
′
A) =
λ22
4
M∑
m=1
α2mβ
2
m(1 + β
2
m)
(1 + β2m + λ1α
2
m)
2 =
M∑
m=1
Pm = PT ⇒ λ1 = PT
1 + P ′A
. (64)
We also have
PT =
M∑
m=1
(1 + β2m)c
2
m =
λ22
4
M∑
m=1
(1 + β2m)
α2mβ
2
m
(1 + β2m + λ1α
2
m)
2
⇒ λ2 =
√√√√√ 4PTM∑
m=1
(1+β2m)α
2
mβ
2
m
(1+β2m+λ1α
2
m)
2
Plugging the expressions of λ1 and λ2 in (60), we obtain the equilibrium cost.
Remark 4. If Assumption 1 is replaced with Assumption 2 in setting I, coordination becomes redundant for the attacker. This
is because the optimal attack strategy uses only one sensor, and there is no need to coordinate (generate the same realization
of θ(i)).
Remark 5. The optimal strategies can be computed for each sensor in a decentralized manner. The central agent can compute
the optimal values of λ1 and λ2 and then broadcast this information to all sensors. Next, each transmitter sensor can compute
its own mapping based on local parameters αm and βm and the broadcasted global parameters λ1 and λ2.
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Finally, we analyze the asymmetric setting where the sensors are not allowed to coordinate. We characterize the policies
achieving the Stackelberg equilibrium and associated cost in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For setting II, and under Assumption 2, the encoding functions for the transmitter and the adversarial sensors at
the Stackelberg equilibrium are:
Xm(i) = cm Um(i), 1 ≤ m ≤M, Xk(i) = ck Uk(i), M + 1 ≤ k ≤M +K
where
cm =
λ4αmβm
2 (1 + β2m + λ3α
2
m)
, ck =
λ2αkβk
2 (1 + β2k − λ1α2k)
. (65)
and λ1 ∈ R, λ2 ∈ R+, λ3 ∈ R, λ4 ∈ R+ are constants that satisfy the following equations:
λ2 = −
2PA + 2λ1
(
1−
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
)
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm
,
PA + λ1
(
1−
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
)
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm

2
M+K∑
k=M+1
(1 + β2k)α
2
kβ
2
k
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)2
= PA.
and
λ4λ1 = −λ2λ3, 1 = PT
λ1
+
PA
λ3
,
λ24
4
M∑
m=1
α2mβ
2
m(1 + β
2
m)
(1 + β2m + λ3α
2
m)
2 = PT .
The optimal receiver is the Bayesian estimator of S given Y , i.e.,
h(Y (i)) =
M+K∑
m=1
βmcmαm
1 +
M+K∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m +
(
M+K∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2 Y (i). (66)
The cost at this Stackelberg equilibrium is
JASNC(M,K) =
(
1 + λ3
M∑
m=1
α2mβ
2
m
2 (1 + β2m + λ3α
2
m)
− λ1
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kβ
2
k
2 (1 + β2k − λ1α2k)
)−1
. (67)
Proof: Since Player 1 (the transmitter sensors and the receiver) is the leader of this Stackelberg game and the adversarial
sensors are the followers, we first compute the best response of the attacker to the given transmitter strategy and associated
receiver policy. By the reasoning in Theorem 2, we conclude that the best adversary strategy is to use linear maps as given
in the theorem statement. In the following, we compute the optimal adversary coefficients, ck, k ∈ [M + 1 : M + K] as a
function of cm,m ∈ [1 : M ]. We first compute the expressions used in the MMSE computations as:
Y =
M+K∑
m=1
cm αmUm + Z (68)
E{SY } =
M+K∑
m=1
βmcmαm, E{Y 2} = 1 +
(
M+K∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2
+
M+K∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m. (69)
The objective of the attacker is to maximize
J = 1− (E{SY })
2
E{Y 2} =
1 +
M+K∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
1 +
M+K∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m +
(
M+K∑
m=1
βmcmαm
)2 . (70)
over ck, k ∈ [M + 1 : M +K] that satisfy
M+K∑
k=M+1
(1 + β2k)c
2
k ≤ PA. (71)
This problem is again non-convex, hence we follow the approach we used in the proof of Theorem 4: we first introduce a
slack variable.
rK =
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck, (72)
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and apply the KKT optimality conditions. The stationarity conditions applied to the following Lagrangian cost
JA =
M+K∑
k=M+1
(
1 + β2k
)
c2k +λ1
(
(rK +
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm)
2(J−1 − 1)−1 −1−
M+K∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
)
+ λ2
(
rK −
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)
, (73)
where λ1 ∈ R+ and λ2 ∈ R, yield
∂JA
∂ck
=2ck(1+β
2
k)−2λ1ckα2k−λ2αkβk=0, (74)
∂JA
∂rK
= 2λ1(J
−1 − 1)−1(rK +
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm) + λ2 = 0, (75)
and we have (72) and
1 +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m +
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kc
2
k =
(
J−1 − 1)−1 (rK + M∑
m=1
αmβmcm)
2. (76)
From (74), we have
ck =
λ2αkβk
2 (1 + β2k − λ1α2k)
. (77)
Using (77) in (72), we have
−λ2
2λ1
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm − λ
2
2
4λ1
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kβ
2
k
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)
= 1 +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m +
λ22
4
M+K∑
k=M+1
α4kβ
2
k
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)2
(78)
which simplifies to
−λ2
2λ1
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm − 1−
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m =
λ22
4λ1
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kβ
2
k(1 + β
2
k)
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)2
= PA/λ1 (79)
or
−λ2
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm − 2λ1(1−
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m) = 2PA ⇒ λ2 = −
2PA + 2λ1
(
1−
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
)
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm
(80)
Plugging (77) in (71), we have
λ22
4
M+K∑
k=M+1
(1 + β2k)α
2
kβ
2
k
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)2
=
PA + λ1
(
1−
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m
)
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm

2
M+K∑
k=M+1
(1 + β2k)α
2
kβ
2
k
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)2
= PA (81)
The unique positive solution of (81) provides the value of λ1 and by (80), λ2 can be computed, once λ1 is obtained. Having
obtained the optimal ck, k ∈ [M + 1 : M + K] values as a function of PA and cm,m ∈ [1 : M ], we next derive cm that
minimize (70) subject to
M∑
m=1
(1 + β2m)c
2
m ≤ PT . (82)
Again, we modify the problem as to minimize
M∑
m=1
(1 + β2m)c
2
m subject to
1 +
M+K∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m ≤ (J−1 − 1)−1
(
r +
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)2
, (83)
and
r =
M∑
m=1
αmβmcm. (84)
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The stationarity conditions applied to the following Lagrangian cost
JT =
M∑
m=1
(
1 + β2m
)
c2m +λ3
1 +M+K∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m −
(
r +
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)2
(J−1 − 1)−1
+ λ4(r − M∑
m=1
αmβmcm
)
, (85)
for λ3 ∈ R+ and λ4 ∈ R yield
∂JT
∂r
= −2λ3(J−1 − 1)−1
(
r +
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)
+ λ4 = 0, (86)
∂JT
∂cm
=2cm(1+β
2
m)+2λ3cmα
2
m+ 2λ3
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kckc
′
k − 2λ3(J−1 − 1)−1
(
r +
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkc
′
k− λ4αmβm
= 2cm(1+β
2
m)+2λ3cmα
2
m+ 2λ3
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kckc
′
k − λ4
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkc
′
k− λ4αmβm=0 (87)
where c′k =
∂ck
∂cm
and (87) follows from (86). We also have (84) and
1 +
M∑
m=1
α2mc
2
m +
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kc
2
k =
(
J−1 − 1)−1(r + M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)2
(88)
=
λ4
2λ3
(
r +
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)
(89)
as necessary conditions of optimality. Comparing (89) and (75), we have
λ4
λ3
= −λ2
λ1
. (90)
We next use (90) to rewrite the terms involving c′k:
2λ3
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kckc
′
k − λ4
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkc
′
k =
∂
∂cm
(
2λ1
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kc
2
k + λ2
M+K∑
k=M+1
αkβkck
)
=
∂
∂cm
PA = 0 (91)
Using (91) in (87), we obtain
cm =
λ4αmβm
2 (1 + β2m + λ3α
2
m)
(92)
Plugging (92) and (77) in (89) and using (90), we have
1+
λ24
4
M∑
m=1
α4mβ
2
m
(1 + β2m + λ3α
2
m)
2+
λ22
4
M+K∑
k=M+1
α4kβ
2
k
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)2
=
λ24
4λ3
M∑
m=1
α2mβ
2
m
(1 + β2m + λ3α
2
m)
− λ
2
2
4λ1
M+K∑
k=M+1
α2kβ
2
k
(1 + β2k − λ1α2k)
which yields, after algebraic manipulations,
1 =
PT
λ1
+
PA
λ3
(93)
We also have
λ24
4
M∑
m=1
α2mβ
2
m(1 + β
2
m)
(1 + β2m + λ3α
2
m)
2 = PT . (94)
The set of equations (80, 81, 90, 93, 94) (essentially) uniquely characterizes the variables λ1, λ2, λ3 and λ4. Plugging these
variables into (86), we obtain the equilibrium cost.
Remark 6. We again observe that, as noted in Remark 5, the optimal power allocation admits a decentralized implementation:
a central agent can compute and broadcast the values of constants λi, i = 1, . . . , 4 and the sensors can implement optimal
communication strategies using the local information αm and βm and these universal constants. The same interpretation also
holds for the Byzantine sensors.
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have conducted a game-theoretical analysis of joint source-channel communication over a Gaussian sensor
network with Byzantine sensors. Depending on the coordination capabilities of the sensors, we have analyzed three problem
settings. The first setting allows coordination among the transmitter sensors, first for the totally symmetric case. Coordination
capability enables the transmitters to use randomized encoders. The saddle-point solution to this problem is randomized uncoded
transmission for the transmitters and the coordinated generation of i.i.d. Gaussian noise for the adversarial sensors. In the second
setting, transmitter sensors cannot coordinate, and hence they use fixed, deterministic mappings. The solution to this problem
is shown to be uncoded communication with linear mappings for both the transmitter and the adversarial sensors, but with
opposite signs. We note that coordination aspect of the problem is entirely due to game-theoretic considerations, i.e., if no
adversarial sensors exist, the transmitters do not need coordination. In the third setting, where only a fraction of sensors can
coordinate, the solution depends on the number of transmitter and adversarial sensors that can coordinate. If the gain from
coordination for the transmitter sensors and the receiver, is sufficiently high, only the coordination-capable transmitter sensors
are used. Then, the problem simplifies to an instance of setting I, i.e, there exists a unique saddle-point solution achieved
by randomized linear mappings as the transmitter and the receiver strategy and independent noise as the adversarial strategy.
Otherwise, the transmitters do not utilize coordination, all available transmitter sensors are used, and the problem becomes an
instance of setting II: a saddle-point solution does not exist and the Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved by deterministic linear
strategies.
Our analysis has uncovered an interesting result regarding coordination among the transmitter sensors and the receiver, and
among the adversarial nodes. If the transmitter nodes can coordinate, then the adversaries will benefit from coordination, i.e.,
all will generate the identical realization of an i.i.d. Gaussian noise sequence. If the transmitters cannot coordinate, adversarial
sensors do not benefit from coordination, and the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium is at strictly higher cost than the one when
transmitters can coordinate (setting I).
Finally, we have analyzed the impact of optimal power allocation among both the transmitter (defender) and the adversarial
(attacker) sensors when various parameters that define the game are not the same for all sensors–the asymmetric case. We have
shown that the optimal attack strategy, when the defender can coordinate, allocates all attack power on the best sensor, where
the criteria of the selection of best sensor pertains to the receiver SNR. Moreover, the flexibility of power allocation renders
coordination superfluous for the adversarial sensors, while it remains beneficial for the transmitter sensors. In the absence
of coordination, both the optimal transmitter and the optimal attacker strategies use all available sensors to distribute power
optimally.
Several questions still remain open and are currently under investigation, including extensions of the analysis to vector
sources and channels. The information-theoretic analysis of such a setting requires a vector form of Witsenhausen’s Lemma,
which is an important research question in its own right, see [35] for recent progress in this direction. The investigation of
optimal power allocation strategies for asymmetric settings for vector sources and channels, and the scaling analysis, in terms
of the number sensors, are parts of our current research.
APPENDIX A
THE GAUSSIAN CEO PROBLEM
In the Gaussian CEO problem, an underlying Gaussian source S ∼ N (0, σ2S) is observed under additive noise W ∼
N (0, RW ) as U = S +W . These noisy observations, i.e., U , must be encoded in such a way that the decoder produces a
good approximation to the original underlying source. This problem was proposed in [36] and solved in [37] (see also [38],
[39]). A lower bound for this function for the non-Gaussian sources within the “symmetric” setting where all U ’s have identical
statistics was presented in [40]. Here, we simply extend the results in [38] to our setting, noting
D = E{(S − Sˆ)2}, (95)
R = min I(U ; Sˆ), (96)
where U = βS+W , W ∼ N (0, RW ), and RW is an M×M identity matrix. The minimization in (96) is over all conditional
densities p(sˆ|u) that satisfy (95). The MSE distortion can be written as sum of two terms
D =E{(S − T + T − Sˆ)2} = E{(S − T )2}+ E{(T − Sˆ)2}, (97)
where T , E{S|U}. Note that (97) holds since
E{(S − T )(Sˆ − T )} = 0, (98)
as the estimation error, S−T is orthogonal to any function7 of the observation, U . The estimation error Dest , E{(S−T )2}
is constant with respect to p(sˆ|u), i.e., a fixed function of U and S. Hence, the minimization is over the densities that satisfy
7Note that Sˆ is also a deterministic function of U , since the optimal reconstruction can always be achieved by deterministic codes.
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a distortion constraint of the form E{(T − Sˆ)2} ≤ Drd and R = min I(U ; Sˆ). Hence, we write (97) as
D = Drd +Dest. (99)
Note that due to their Gaussianity, T is a sufficient statistic of U for S, i.e., S−T −U forms a Markov chain in that order and
T ∼ N (0, σ2T ). Hence, R = min I(U ; Sˆ) = min I(T ; Sˆ) where minimization is over p(sˆ|t) that satisfy E{(T − Sˆ)2} ≤ Drd,
where all variables are Gaussian. This is the classical Gaussian rate-distortion problem, and hence:
Drd(R) = σ
2
T 2
−2R. (100)
Note that T = RSUR−1U U , where RSU , E{SUT } and RU , E{UUT } which can be written explicitly as:
RU =

1 + β21 β1β2 . . . β1βM
β1β2 1 + β
2
2 . . . β2βM
...
. . .
...
β1βM . . . 1 + β
2
M
 . (101)
Since RU is structured, it can easily be manipulated. In particular, RU admits an eigen-decomposition RU = QTUΛQU where
QU is unitary and Λ is a diagonal matrix with elements 1, . . . , 1, 1 +
∑
m β
2
m. We compute σ
2
T as
σ2T = RSUR
−1
U R
T
SU = σ
2
S
M∑
m=1
β2m
1 +
M∑
m=1
β2m
, (102)
and using standard linear estimation principles, we obtain
Dest = σ
2
S
1
1 +
M∑
m=1
β2m
. (103)
Plugging (103) in (100) and using (99) yields
D = σ2S
 1
1 +
M∑
m=1
β2m
+
M∑
m=1
β2m
1 +
M∑
m=1
β2m
2−2R
 . (104)
APPENDIX B
WITSENHAUSEN’S LEMMA
In this section, we recall Witsenhausen’s lemma [41], which is used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. Consider a pair of random variables X and Y , generated from a joint density PX,Y , and two (Borel measurable)
arbitrary functions f, g : R→ R satisfying
E{f(X)}= E{g(Y )}=0, (105)
E{f2(X)}=E{g2(Y )}=1. (106)
Define
ρ∗ , sup
f,g
E{f(X)g(Y )} (107)
Then for any (Borel measurable) functions fN , gN : RN → R satisfying
E{fN (X)}=E{gN (Y )} = 0, (108)
E{f2N (X)}=E{g2N (Y )} = 1, (109)
for length N vectors sampled from the independent and identically distributed random sequences {X(i)} and {Y (i)},where
each X(i), Y (i) pair is generated from PX,Y , as X = {X(i)}Ni=1 and Y = {Y (i)}Ni=1, we have
sup
fN ,gN
E{fN (X)gN (Y )} ≤ ρ∗. (110)
Moreover, the supremum and the infimum above are attained by linear mappings, if PX,Y is a bivariate normal density.
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